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Abstract: Digital rights management ("DRM") and trusted
systems offer the promise of enhanced protection of virtually
any form of data, but at the same time jeopardize user rights
to this data and user privacy. Finding the right medium that
appropriately balances these concerns has proven difficult.
This note first explores the role of the current legal
framework regulating DRM technologies and trusted
systems. The note then discusses how DRM can protect
copyright owners' rights. These measures and their
associated legal enforcement are part of a battle between
proprietary appliance-like systems that are a product of the
DRM lockdown, and the commons-based model that
dominates the Internet and information networks today.
The note next explores how trusted systems can protect
personal information, much like how DRM has been used to
safeguard creative content. The note then elaborates on how
DRM and trusted systems may harm the privacy interests of
users performing transactions with these systems. The note
ultimately concludes with a discussion on technological
implementations and legal reforms that could accommodate
both data owners and users.
Saif Khan is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. He
earned both a B.A. and MA in Physics from Wayne State University. The author thanks
Peter Swire, Martha Landesberg and Dennis Hirsch for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
1/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
This note explores the ability of digital rights management
("DRM") technologies, and particularly, trusted systems, to protect
content or sensitive data while also potentially intruding on the
privacy of users who access such information or databases containing
this information.
DRM encompasses technological measures built into physical
devices that restrict content usage, such as access controls, copy
restrictions, embedded identifications in content, and surveillance.1
More specific examples of these technologies include digital
watermarks, encryption, and restrictions to content access based on
time, location, method of access, or content amount. In particular,
trusted systems are focused applications of DRM technologies which
require devices to obey rules defined by owners. 2
Corporations often have incentives to use DRM in order to obtain
extra royalties through enhanced protection of content. Some believe
this use to be a natural extension of copyright, while others believe
that copyright was never intended to reach so far. In addition to
protecting creative content, corporations may similarly implement
trusted systems to safeguard personal information. On the other hand,
corporations also like to use data for marketing, and therefore may
not want trusted systems because they are expensive to build and
maintain. Finally, many privacy advocates are concerned that DRM
systems and trusted systems can be inimical to the privacy interests of
users who attempt to access these systems, depending on system
design.
Part II surveys the current legal framework for regulating and
enforcing DRM. The DRM anti-circumvention provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act constitute the primary legal
enforcement of DRM.
In Part III, the note explores how DRM technologies can greatly
expand the protection of content. Part III also explains, however, that
such a DRM lockdown raises a number of policy concerns including
I Graham Greenleaf, IP, Phone Home: The Uneasy Relationship Between Copyright and
Privacy, Illustrated in the Laws of Hong Kong and Australia, 32 HONG KONG L.J. 35, 43-
46 (2002).
, TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE 52
(2007).
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the normatively proper scope of a copyright owner's rights and DRM's
ultimate effect on creativity.3
Just as DRM systems can protect creative content, Part IV
examines how trusted systems can also safeguard sensitive personal
information. Specifically, trusted systems can provide enhanced
protection of virtually any type of information - including digital
content and personal information such as medical and financial
records - by implementing a layered system of access controls.4 This
enhanced privacy regime makes it much harder for internal employees
or external hackers to retrieve sensitive personal information from
company databases.
Although DRM and trusted systems can provide many protective
benefits for content and data owners, Part V of the note discusses how
certain types of DRM and trusted systems may create privacy risks to
users who access protected content or data by exposing users'
personal information during authentication. The ultimate balance
between content owners' rights and users' rights, however, is sensitive
to the type of trusted system implemented.5 In some versions,
proprietors can conduct surveillance of all users engaging in data
transactions or accessing their networks or databases simply by
configuring DRM to collect these users' ID data.6 Other variants
prevent owners from receiving these reports.7 A principal risk is the
surveillance of all infringing and/or illegal user activities with respect
to content and data.8 This surveillance could shrink the private
sphere of personal activities and transactions that the law was unable
to regulate prior to the existence of DRM.9
In Part VI, the note closes with a commentary on finding the right
medium in the private sphere that best accommodates content
owners' rights and users' privacy interests. Specifically, this Part
a In this note, the "DRM lockdown" refers to the ubiquitous application of DRM
technologies.
4 GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 53.
5 Kim Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the
Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 123, 169 (2004).
6 Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 575, 585-86 (2003).
7 Id.
8 Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 67.
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explores DRM designs and legal reforms that could help achieve this
balance.
II. EXISTING LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF DRM TECHNOLOGIES
The information infrastructure, which refers to communication
networks, devices and software that govern the transfer of
information, was initially unregulated and content passed through the
infrastructure unencumbered. For example, internet protocols, which
form one part of the information infrastructure, for most of their
history were not proprietary and were developed through publicly-
funded research. 1° Justifying a need to render the information
infrastructure conducive to the delivery of digital content without
copying, lobbyists proposed the development of a regulatory
framework that would enforce technological protections of content
flow within the information infrastructure."
The WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 ("WCT") requires member
countries to implement laws banning DRM circumvention.12 As a
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") member, the
United States Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998 ("DMCA"). 13 The DMCA prohibits circumvention of
technological measures that control access to a work4 and its related
preparatory activities, such as manufacturing, importing, offering to
the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking in technologies that
circumvent access control measures.'5 Such prohibitions are generally
imposed regardless of whether the circumvention or preparatory
activities result in or are intended for copyright infringement. 6
Additionally, the DMCA prohibits preparatory activities for
lo YOCHAI BENCKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 412 (2006).
I
- Id. at 395, 413.
12 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996.
13 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
14 17 U.S.C. § 12o1(a)(1) (2000).
15 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (2000).
i6 Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital Millennium
CopyrightAct: Much Ado about Nothing?, 50 WM. &MARY L. REV. 349,364 (2008).
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circumventing copy control measures that allow access to copyrighted
works but restrict copying.7
The DMCA has generated much controversy, yet it has thus far
survived constitutional challenges. Although the Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, arguably the most influential federal circuit court on
copyright,18 affirmed the district court ruling in Universal City Studios
v. Corley. There, the Second Circuit held that an injunction against
distributing software designed to circumvent DVD security technology
did not violate the plaintiffs claimed fair use rights,'9 and that the
injunction's burden on speech did not outweigh government interests
and therefore did not violate the First Amendment.20 However,
Corley was not an ideal factual scenario in which to challenge the
DMCA because it dealt with distribution as opposed to a technology
directly geared at restricting fair uses. 21 Thus, the DMCA remains
susceptible to challenge in future lawsuits.
Other nations and supra-national entities have enacted similar
provisions. The E.U. passed three directives22 that include anti-
17 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (2000).
18 Georgia K Harper, The Copyright Crash Course, Building On Others' Creative
Expression: Professional Fair Use after Texaco n. 11,
http://copyright.lib.utexas.edu/tex2.html (last visited April 8, 2010).
19 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001). The doctrine
of fair use allows consumers a limited use of copyrighted works without permission from
copyright owners. For example, consumers can incorporate part of a copyrighted work in a
subsequent new work. A four-factor test governs whether a particular use of a copyrighted
work is a fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
2o Corley, 273 F.3d at 458.
21 Id. at 459-60.
22 See Council Directive 91/25o/EEC of May 14, 1991, on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs,1991 O.J.E.U. (L 122) 42, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31991Lo250:EN:HTML; Directive
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2001, on the
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society,2001 O.J.E.U. (L 167) lo, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:oolo:ool9:EN:PDF;
Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 20, 1998,
on the Legal Protection of Services Based on, or Consisting of, Conditional Access, 1998
O.J.E.U.. (L 320) 54, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998Loo84:EN:HTML. These
directives were not self-executing and required E.U. member states to enact legislation to
achieve the directives' aims.
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circumvention provisions, including provisions prohibiting actual
circumvention of effective measures as well as preparatory activities
associated therewith, such as circulation, production, promotion, and
possession for commercial purposes. 23 Japan's implementation of the
WCT is less sweeping than the U.S. or the E.U. In contrast to the U.S.
approach, Japan neither prohibits circumvention of access control nor
prohibits circumvention of uses falling under copyright exemptions
such as fair uses.24
III. PERSPECTIVES ON COPYRIGHT AND THE DRM LocKDowN
Proponents of DRM and the so-called proprietary model cite
several rationales supporting the implementation of the DRM
lockdown in view of copyright owner rights. Principally, DRM can
potentially solve the problem of the non-exclusivity of digital content.
An expanded role of DRM also complements a generally expanded
role for intellectual property rights in protecting business interests.
On the other hand, opponents of the DRM lockdown advocate
openness and suggest that the costs outweigh these perceived benefits.
These costs include encroachment on the fair use doctrine and a
transformation from a commons-based model to a proprietary model
favoring big business at the expense of the public.
A. How DRM CAN PROTECT CONTENT OWNERS' RIGHTS
Normally, digital content is a non-exclusive good-one which
current technology allows for the creation of an unlimited number of
perfect copies at a negligible cost to a copier. Such non-exclusivity
results in consumers committing wide-scale acts of copyright
infringement. Additionally, non-exclusivity limits the ways that
content owners can market digital content.
Since DRM has the ability to restrict users' ability to access and/or
copy content, DRM can render such content exclusive. In this
scenario, infringement is curtailed because it becomes more
technically difficult and expensive - even illegal - under the DMCA.
Moreover, DRM's ability to transform digital content into an exclusive
23 Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 323, 335-36 (2004).
24 Yuko Noguchi, Freedom Override by Digital Rights Management Technologies: Causes
in Market Mechanisms and Possible Legal Options to Keep a Better Balance, 11 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 1, 9-10 (2006).
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good can enhance the content's marketability, enabling content
owners to generate varied business models.25 For example, content
owners could utilize price-discrimination models, which could
increase social welfare by providing wider access to content.26
Additionally, content exclusivity may reduce transaction costs
associated with content distribution. For example, such exclusivity
could reduce the costs of rights clearance by providing direct licensing
online, as opposed to utilizing intermediaries for distributing
copyrighted works.27
In the past decade-and-a-half, proponents of this proprietary
model have vigorously lobbied Congress to expand the scope of
intellectual property rights2 8 and technological regulation. These
lobbyists, primarily from the film and music industries, cite the need
to protect their business models and argue that enhanced legal
protection is a legitimate method to fortify the incentive-based
model.29
Trusted systems are one implementation of the proprietary model;
these systems turn "personal computers away from being purely
general-purpose computation devices toward being devices with
factory-defined behaviors vis-a-vis predicted-use patterns, like
glorified televisions and CD players."3o Some copyright holders value
this transformation since computers become tools for the
dissemination of content on the copyright holders' terms. These
terms can include implementing factory-defined behaviors that
prevent copying.
Lobbyists supporting the proprietary model also hope for a
stronger regulatory framework that favors the development of such
specialized devices. In 2002, the U.S. Senate considered the
Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act ("CBDTPA"), which
would have required computer manufacturers to include trusted
25 Id. at 5-6.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 One caveat to note is that although patent protection underwent an expansionary trend
during the 199os and early 2000s, this trend has reserved in recent years. Copyrights, on
the other hand, continue to receive term extensions and other expansions in scope.
29 BENCKLER, supra note lo, at 380-81.
30 Id. at 397.
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systems in their computers that would render certain types of software
incompatible with the computer chip.31 However, that bill never came
out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Another pro-DRM effort was
more successful, at least initially: Hollywood's intense lobbying
convinced the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to require
all devices capable of receiving digital television signals from a
television to conform to a particular trusted system standard.32 This
would have been accomplished in part by including broadcast flags in
the digital signals that indicate any restrictions on content stored
therein, particularly whether the signals can be recorded. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the regulations,
however, on grounds that the FCC had exceeded its authority, which
extends only to the regulation of transmissions and not the devices
that receive them.33
Finally, content owners utilize contracts to strengthen their
property rights.34 For example, copyright owners utilize click-wrap
(shrink wrap) licenses to impose conditions on content, artifacts, and
devices, although many of these contracts have questionable
enforceability due to the inequities and power differentials involved.35
Certain DRM developers and copyright owners may work in tandem
and utilize licenses to ensure that such distribution of content is
allowed only with a particular form of DRM.36 Content owners may
also enter into distribution licenses with intermediaries requiring
them to maintain DRM protections.37
31 Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 1o7th Cong. 1st Sess. § 5
(2001). Lobbyists had earlier proposed the Security Systems Standards and Certification
Act; however, Congress never considered that version of the bill.
32 47 C.F.R. § 73.9002(b) (2008).
33 Am. Library Ass'n v. Fed. Comm'ns Comm'n, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
34 Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 42.
35 Id. Although few courts have ruled on the validity of click-wrap licenses, most have
upheld them. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the validity of a click-wrap license); contra Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487
F.Supp.2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding aspects of a click-wrap contract
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable).
36 Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 42 (citing Bechtold, supra note 23, at part 4).
37 Id. at 42.
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B. OPPOSITION TO THE DRM LocKDOwN
Lawrence Lessig has noted that the future of innovation is in
jeopardy because of overregulation by a combination of both copyright
and DRM.38 DRM can countermand copyright exemptions and
otherwise non-infringing uses, as well as free access to copyrighted
materials.39 According to Lessig, the zone of unregulated content,
such as reading a public-domain work in the pre-digital era, has now
become regulated by DRM in the digital era. Lessig believes that fair
use, which was traditionally used as a defense for content regulated by
copyright law, now also carries the burden of being a defense for DRM
regulated content,4o and that free dissemination of content and
derivative creativity may be further encumbered.
Critics believe that a proprietary model comprised of a full
implementation of DRM and trusted systems could result in the
suppression of creativity.41 Yochai Benkler describes this lockdown as
a part of a larger battle between the market-based, proprietary models
that serve mass media and "pharmaceutical-style" innovation, and the
commons-based and nonproprietary model of production.42 Jonathan
Zittrain refers to the transformation of all-purpose technologies to
"tethered appliances."3 Specifically, the personal computer may be
converted from a substantially programmable and customizable
machine into a tethered appliance like a telephone, which is
constructed for very specific functionality as designed by its
proprietor. As such, the DRM lockdown can turn general-purpose,
smart computers into special-purpose, dumb computers, thereby
undermining the democratic and innovative potential of networks, the
38 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 131-182 (2004). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000) (suggesting that DRM-like computer code can
regulate conduct much like legal code); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006)
(updating the argument that computer code can regulate conduct); James Grimmelmann,
Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719 (2005) (elaborating on Lessig's proposition
that "code is law.").
39 Noguchi, supra note 24, at 7-8.
40 FREE CULTURE, supra note 38, at 143-45.
41 See BENCKLER, supra note 10; Gillespie, supra note 2, at part 3, ch. 11; FREE CULTURE,
supra note 38.
42 See BENCKLER, supra note 10, at 381.
43 JONATHAN ZITFRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 3 (2008).
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Internet, and media.44 The Internet in particular could undergo a
transformation from what Jonathan Zittrain has called a generative
network to an appliance-based network due to DRM, trusted systems,
and Web 2.0 applications. Such a transition, these critics argue, is
dangerous and would destroy the creative potential of the Internet.45
Benckler also suggests that lobbyists advocating expanded content
regulation via copyright and DRM are merely engaged in rent-
seeking.46 This line of argument suggests that Congress has a
responsibility to preserve content for the public good as opposed to
merely serving corporate lobbies, and that the over-expansion in
general of intellectual property rights burdens creativity rather than
incentivizing it.47 Tarleton Gillespie and Dan Burk further argue that
DRM and trusted systems represent an overly paternalistic view of
information users as entities who are incapable of making decisions
themselves.48
Moreover, critics note that absent regulation, most trusted
systems have not been successful either because they are easily hacked
into or because they have not proven marketable.49 Going further,
even if trusted systems were impenetrable and could not be subverted,
recording analog copies of content remains simple.5o For example, a
user can record content by placing a microphone next to a DRM-
44 Id. at8.
45 Generative networks allow users to customize their networks to meet their needs,
whereas an appliance-based network is restricted to pre-defined uses set by a proprietor.
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 43; FREE CULTURE, supra note 38; BENCKLER, supra note 10.
46 BENCKLER, supra note 10, at 461.
47 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Through
the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 216-18 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property
and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure
for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 50-51 (2001).
48 Dan Burk & Tarleton Gillespie, Autonomy and Morality in DRM and Anti-
Circumvention Law, 4 TRIPLE C 239 (2006).
49 ZITrRAIN, supra note 43, at 105; Joan Feigenbaum & Peter Swire, Control of Personal
Information: A Dialogue Between a Technologist and a Lawyer, Slide 17, Radcliffe Inst.
and Harvard Div. of E&AS Symposium on Security and Privacy (2004).
50 ZITrRAIN, supra note 43, at 115.
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protected audio player. Finally, as long as the all-purpose PC remains
a central component of networks and the information stream, the
ability to implement trusted systems will remain limited.51 This is
because users will still utilize their PCs in a generative fashion, and
trusted system restrictions will not substantially limit users' abilities
to customize their PCs to perform any desired tasks.52
The DMCA has also fallen under intense criticism. Critics assert
that the bundle of rights granted by a copyright is not exclusive in the
sense that real property rights are exclusive. Thus, there are many
uses of copyrightable materials-such as fair uses and even uses of
public domain works-that courts have always held to be non-
infringing, yet these uses are nevertheless criminalized by the DMCA.
For example, the DMCA criminalizes circumventing DRM restrictions
in e-book readers even for novels in the public domain.53
Further, some critics have argued that the DMCA is both vague
and overbroad, resulting in civil and/or criminal liability for parties
who many argue should be exempt from anti-circumvention liability.
For example, while the DMCA includes an exemption for
researchers,54 the overall provision is vague and has thus adversely
affected the cryptography research community.55 In one case, when
Edward Felten, a computer science professor at Princeton University,
planned to present a paper on weaknesses of certain encryption
technologies at an academic conference, several proprietors
subsequently threatened him with a DMCA lawsuit.56  Thus, the
DMCA has gone so far as to curtail academic freedoms.
Skeptics even wonder whether the DMCA accomplishes what it set
out to do: namely, to prevent piracy. Even if the DMCA successfully
deters the circulation of anti-circumvention software, which is
debatable, the existence of similar unprotected content elsewhere may
51 Id. at 123.
52 Id. Also, the ability for networks to block streams of incoming information or regulate
the speed with which the network can access the streams can further segregate networks
and transform them into appliances. BENCKLER, supra note 10, at 397-98. This has given
rise to the network neutrality movement, which criticizes these information exchange
gradients.
53 BENCKLER, supra note 10, at 415.
54 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000).
55 BENCKLER, supra note 10, at 416.
56 FREE CULTURE, supra note 38, at 155-57.
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draw consumers to those sources. It takes only a single person to
decrypt content and upload it to the Internet.57 In order to be
worthwhile, anti-circumvention laws need to be part of a
comprehensive approach in regulating all sources of content, an
increasingly difficult task in the digital information age.
Critics also allege that ever-expanding copyright laws over-protect
content, which is a concern because DRM coupled with strong
copyright laws creates a restrictive climate for consumers.58 Intense
lobbying by mass-media industries has resulted in copyright term
extensions that continue to prevent copyrighted materials from falling
into the public domain.59 Moreover, the scope of copyrightable
materials has slowly expanded to cover virtually all forms of creativity,
including performances and broadcasts. Copyrights are generally
available without registration and inhere in a creative work,6° thus
providing for protection that content-owners might otherwise forego if
registration were required.
IV. How TRUSTED SYSTEMS CAN PROTECT PERSONAL INFORMATION
Technological measures conferring protection to creative content
can be similarly used to safeguard sensitive personal information,
although these measures must be specifically tailored to that end. In
this regard, trusted systems have great potential. Trusted systems
require devices to enforce rules defined by proprietors.61 Such rules
may be built into devices, embedded in content, or sent by licensing
authorities when users initiate functions requiring authorization. 62
For example, trusted systems may only allow users to access protected
content if the users' personal computers ("PCs") provide identification
57 Timothy B. Lee, Circumventing Competition: The Perverse Consequences of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS no. 564, Mar. 21, 2006, at 12,
available at http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=6o25.
58 BENCKLER, supra note 10, at 395.
59 The most recent term extension was in 1998, which extended copyrights for an
additional twenty years. See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 11 Stat.
2827 (1998).
6o 17 U.S.C. § 4o8(a) (2000) (stating that "registration is not a condition of copyright
protection.").
61 GILLESPIE, supra note 2, at 52.
62/d.
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data in order to authorize access. Another example is trusted printing,
where an online work will only print if payment is first made, the work
is sent to the printer in encrypted form, and the copies are
watermarked. 63
Proponents of trusted systems argue that their utility in protecting
personal information is especially high in light of our lack of ability to
prevent misuse of information by parties who have access to it. Thus,
the only remaining way to control this misuse is to block anyone's
ability to access that information; trusted systems are one way to do
that.64 However, since there is no absolute method to prove trust,
trusted systems are typically incapable of flagging all untrustworthy
access attempts. 65 Therefore, a layered approach that authenticates
access through a variety of means would be most effective. 66 A
comprehensive and working approach should be comprised of a
combination of hardware, software, people, procedures, and law.67
Technological protection, including hardware and software-based
methods, is necessary but not sufficient to secure data; therefore, the
law needs to work in tandem with technology to better ensure that
these systems properly protect information privacy.68
Software-based management rights, such as data masking,69 role
based access controls,7O VIP systems,71 or logging and audits,72 are
useful in preventing routine violations by employees who attempt to
63 Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 44.
64 Feigenbaum & Swire, supra note 49, at Slide 8.
65 Taipale, supra note 5, at 167.
66 Id.
67 Feigenbaum & Swire, supra note 49, at Slide 30, 34-35.
68 Id. at Slide 21-22.
69 Data masking provides a layer of protection by in this context de-identifying personal
data. Peter Swire, Peeping, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming) at *23-25, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid= 1418091.
70 Role based access controls only allow people in authorized roles to perform given
activities in a computer system. Id. at 19-20.
7' VIP systems can provide extra procedures for persons who are likelier targets. Id. at 20-
22.
72 A computer system can log access attempts and audit the logs in order to "deter, detect,
and prove privacy violations." Id. at 25-27.
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"peep" into restricted work databases. However, software-based
measures have limited enforceability in that they may still be
susceptible to advanced and determined cryptographic attacks.73
Hardware can supplement software to provide a stronger
approach. Trusted systems that utilize "hardware-based,
cryptographic support" can be implemented to prove that a machine
accessing the data is running a particular software stack.74 However,
there are numerous hurdles before such a method can be
implemented. These systems require a high level of technical
sophistication to build, to say nothing of the business and legal
concerns mentioned earlier.75 Further, these systems are still subject
to information leakage, which is arguably a greater threat than
circumvention.76
Prevention of peeping is also bolstered through procedure. For
example, employee training and sanctions may deter employees from
engaging in unauthorized information gathering.77 Requiring notice
to individuals following an unauthorized access may also help prevent
security breaches.78
Legal protections constitute a final layer. As discussed earlier, the
DMCA makes circumvention of trusted systems unlawful.79
Additionally, U.S. information privacy law safeguards the privacy of
certain sensitive records. 8 °
73 Feigenbaum & Swire, supra note 49, at Slide 18.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at slide 19.
77 Swire, supra note 69, at 27-28.
78 Id. at 28-31. California has passed the first piece of legislation mandating these notices.
79 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 13.
80 For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, governs when
medical records can be disclosed. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
Pub. L. 104-191, 11o Stat. 1936.
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V. How DRM AND TRUSTED SYSTEMS CAN INFRINGE
CONSUMER PRIVACY
The ability of DRM and trusted systems to protect content or data
is complicated by concurrently-arising privacy concerns. Proprietors
can collect personal information of users who perform transactions
with respect to this data or content via DRM-enabled devices.
Defining privacy is a prerequisite to fully exploring DRM's
privacy-invasive implications. Most definitions incorporate at least
one of two main components. First, intellectual privacy includes
personal autonomy that guarantees "breathing space for thought,
exploration, and personal growth."8 1 Second, intellectual privacy
concerns spatial privacy that allows for intellectual consumption
beyond public view.8 2
In view of these definitions, DRM and trusted systems may usher
in a host of privacy concerns, shifting the balance in favor of content
owners over content users.8 3 DRM may infringe upon the privacy of
consumers both under the personal autonomy definition as well as the
spatial privacy definition. 84 First, DRM's ability to constrain
intellectual choice implicates the personal autonomy definition. 85
Second, its monitoring capability intrudes upon spatial privacy.86
Third, DRM's "self-help" function may give rise to privacy violations
under both the personal autonomy and spatial privacy definitions.8 7
s Cohen, supra note 6, at 577-78.
82 Id. at 578-579.
83 Greenleaf, supra note 1.
84 Cohen, supra note 6, at 580.
85 Id. at 580-584. However, this argument is somewhat undercut by the fact that many
products already deprive intellectual choice. For example, access to a limited number of
television channels could be perceived as a limitation on intellectual choice. Many further
argue that loss of intellectual choice is actually a loss of liberty, not privacy.
86d. at 580-86.
87M. at 586-88. Self-help features in DRM refer to automated mechanisms that could
regulate access if a user attempts an unauthorized use. This feature could be implemented
through external control by communicating user activity to a host. On the other hand, this
functionality could be controlled through internal pre-defined DRM logic, with no
communication to outside entities.
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Of these three functions, DRM's monitoring capability has
garnered the majority of attention.88 While some DRM does not
report a user's activities back to the technology's proprietors, other
types of DRM lockdowns do report information back, infringing upon
the user's privacy.89 Such strict DRM creates several privacy concerns
for content users. The users can be identified and owners can collect
their data on a mass scale, especially when users access content by
submitting unique identifiers.9o What's more, some trusted systems
distribute user data without a user's knowledge and may build user
profiles.91 Personalized marketing schemes based on these user
profiles may deprive users of individual choice and intellectual
freedom.92 Thus, the trusted systems' "[m]onitoring of reading and
viewing habits poses the threat of a 'chilling effect' on freedom to
read, think, and speak."93 Further, consumers could be
disincentivized from conducting fair uses that inconveniently require
permission.94
For time immemorial, the unregulated private sphere has been a
place where individuals can conduct anonymous transactions in the
privacy of their homes. However, this private sphere risks being
obviated by a world in which proprietors observe and record all user
activities.
How copyright monopolists threaten this private sphere via DRM
is well-documented. In the pre-DRM world, many sales of artifacts
containing content (e.g. books) were anonymous, and consumers
rarely entered into contracts directly with content providers, and
88 Id. at 577-78.
89 Id. at 585-86.
9o Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1251 (2000); Cohen, supra note 6, at 575-76.
91 See Weinberg, supra note 9o.
92 See Paul Ganley, Access to the Individual: Digital Rights Management Systems and the
Intersection of Informational and Decisional Privacy Interests, lo INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH.
241, 241 (2002).
93 Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 49.
94 Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49 (2OO6).
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instead dealt with intermediaries (e.g. bookstores).95 Such artifacts
never had any built-in surveillance technologies.96 Owners could not
control artifacts containing the content and did not know if users
loaned artifacts to one another.97 Copyright enforcement was selective
and periodic rather than an all-encompassing real-time surveillance of
infringement, and various fair uses of artifacts were available.98 In
sum, many types of infringement could only be caught in public,
effectively creating a private sphere unregulated by copyright law.99
Critics believe that the existence of this private sphere is one way to
accommodate public welfare in response to an otherwise extreme
copyright monopoly. 1° ° They contend that an implementation of DRM
and/or expanded copyright regimes would disturb this proper
balance, tipping regulation in favor of copyright owners and severely
curtailing the privacy rights of consumers. 1'0
Many DRM proponents accept that DRM significantly expands the
scope of protection, and argue instead that the copyright system was
always intended to give a maximal level of protection to content
owners.'0 2 They do not accept the notion that pre-DRM limitations
properly served the public welfare by balancing against a more
comprehensive copyright monopoly. °3 These proponents believe that
regulating the private sphere is appropriate and finally feasible in view
of DRM technologies that lower the transaction costs of protecting
copyright compared to the pre-DRM world.04
95 Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 37. Of course, credit card sales have long posed information
privacy concerns even before the existence of DRM.
96 Id. at 37.
97 Id. at 37-38.
98Id. at 38.
99 Id.
oo Greenleaf, supra note 1, at 39.
,o, The implementation of various business models may also have an impact, for example
the motivations of third-party intermediaries as far as whether they are neutral parties may
depend on the business models in which they operate. Id. at 51.
102 Id. at 39.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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A distinct privacy concern arises due to the potential for "collateral
damage" from criminalizing a large percentage of the population who
have committed copyright violations.'°5 The risk in such mass
criminalization is that it becomes "trivial, as a matter of due process,
to effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume" for law-
abiding citizens as compared to criminals.' °6 This deprivation of
privacy could include the loss of information privacy. For example,
copyright infringers may no longer be secure against authorities who
may seize infringers' computers and deny them access to the
Internet.107 The DRM lockdown exacerbates the problem through the
creation of ever more copyright criminals.
Privacy risks to the private sphere remain equally salient with
respect to trusted systems designed to protect data. In trusted
systems, the multi-layered authentication process leaves proprietors
ample opportunity to collect user ID data. If all devices, such as PCs,
bought by consumers for the home or implemented by companies
utilize trusted systems, the public at large would find it difficult to
escape their watchful eye when performing any kind of digital
transaction. This statement continues to be true regardless of whether
the transaction is for obtaining copyrighted content or utilizing a
computer system for any other purpose.
The DMCA attempts to address the foregoing concerns by
including an exemption for individual end users to circumvent access
controls if their purpose is to destroy ID data.108 However, two
problems arise. First, this exemption has limited scope, and second, if
circumvented files are altered, they may be rendered "untrusted" and
therefore unusable.o9 Another DMCA provision preserves all federal
and state privacy protections relating to Internet usage.110
105 FREE CULTURE, supra note 38, at 205.
io6 Id.
107 Id. (quoting Fred von Lohmann).
1o8 17 U.S.C. §1201(i) (2000).
1o9 Ryan Roemer, Trusted Computing, Digital Rights Management, and the Fight for
Copyright Control on Your Computer, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 8, part V(A)(4)(b) (2003).
110 17 U.S.C. §1205 (2000).
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VI. NEGOTIATING A BALANCE OF RIGHTS BETWEEN
PROPRIETORS AND USERS
Scholars have suggested several ways of implementing DRM and
trusted systems in order to preserve the data rights of proprietors
while also demarcating the proper boundaries of the private sphere by
safeguarding users' privacy, access, and fair use rights. For example,
Weinberg, Cohen, and Woodford have recommended solutions
applicable to all types of DRM. Noguchi, Burk, Cohen, Mulligan and
Burstein have proposed DRM designs effective for copyright-specific
purposes, although these designs can be similarly applied to trusted
systems that protect data. Many of these systems can be implemented
in combination as well.
A. SOLUTIONS THAT ARE EXPLICITLY APPLICABLE
TO ALL DRM IMPLEMENTATIONS
Weinberg notes that trusted systems incorporating unique
identifiers traceable to users provide maximal benefit to owners at the
expense of user privacy, and therefore suggests balancing the equation
by allowing users to access content with pseudonymous identifiers.111
This is feasible because supplying login credentials does not
inherently require providing identity. The above approach largely
preserves content owners' rights, although it prevents owners from
discriminating among users based on a particular characteristic unless
users provide information relating to that characteristic.112 As this
method posits an authentication process that is public and open to
scrutiny, content owners would be deterred from performing
unpopular actions,113 which would be a socially desirable outcome.
Cohen advocates a value-sensitive framework for DRM design.114
With regard to privacy, Cohen suggests that DRM be designed to: (1)
111 Weinberg, supra note 90, at 1279-80. A pseudonymous identifier is an encrypted name
that is associated with the user in particular contexts, but does not allow a content owner to
probe associations with a user's names in other contexts. Id. at 1279. For an alternative
version implementing pseudonymous credentials, see Claudine Conrado et al., Privacy-
Preserving Digital Rights Management, Secure Data Management: VLDB 2004
Workshop, SDM 2004, LNCS 3178, at 83 (Willem Jonker & Milan Petkovi6 eds., 2004).
112 Weinberg, supra note 9o, at 128o.
113 Id. An unpopular action could for example be a content owner's distribution of collected
user information without user permission.
114 Cohen, supra note 6, at 6o9-16.
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minimize direct constraints on intellectual choice in the private
sphere, (2) limit collection of user information to instances where the
information is necessary for a significant aim, and (3) limit DRM
devices' "self-help" functionality. 115 If non-privacy related benefits,
such as a content owner's rights, are affected, then a choice needs to
be made that explicitly outlines which values are being favored." 6
Cohen also proposes expanding the role of privacy tort law and
consumer protection law to protect users.1" 7
Woodford suggests granting the FCC statutory authority to
regulate DRM, given the FCC's requisite technical expertise and
historical experience in safeguarding the public interest. 18 The FCC
could ensure personal privacy by requiring encryption of private
information when it is used for authentication, and by articulating
explicit policies regarding private information.1 9 The FCC can tailor
these protections to different DRM technologies through case-by-case
oversight.120 The FCC could also regulate DRM systems to be
designed in "modular" ways to accommodate evolving fair use
standards in an efficient manner. 12' A modular design would allow
specific code segments that define fair uses to be swapped easily,
enabling DRM systems to continually update as fair use laws
change.122
B. NOMINALLY COPYRIGHT-SPECIFIC DESIGNS
Various proposed systems specifically tailored for copyright offer
promise in striking a balance between copyright owners and users.
Some early examples include fair use determinations by owners,
purely automatic software algorithms, or escrow agents. An escrow
115 Id. at 611-13.
16 Id. at 612.
117 Id. at 589-609.
118 Chad Woodford, Trusted Computing or Big Brother? Putting the Rights Back in Digital
Rights Management, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 253, 291-92 (2004).
119 Id. at 294.
120 Id.
-1 Id. at 293.
122 Ij.
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agent is a trusted third-party decision-maker such as a public
regulatory body.123 Critics have objected to owners making such
determinations on grounds that owners might improperly apply fair
use law, intrude upon user privacy and anonymity, and chill
spontaneous uses due to a lengthy and complicated approval
process. 124 The algorithm version provides privacy and efficiency
benefits, but there is a lingering concern that purely algorithm based
DRM technologies cannot make effective, case-by-case judgment calls
as to which content to exclude from DRM protection in the same way
that human decision-makers can.125 U.S. fair use law is vaguely
defined, creating challenges in implementing a workable algorithm
that correctly determines when a use is a fair use.126 On the other
hand, escrow agents can effectively determine fair uses, and if user ID
records are subject to stringent protections, they can also preserve
user privacy.127 Still, requiring permission from escrow agents for all
fair uses may be inefficient.12 8
Burk and Cohen have suggested a hybrid two-layer DRM
mechanism comprised of an automatic algorithm and an escrow
agent.12 9  The first layer of this mixed fair use infrastructure
constitutes a set of automatic fair use defaults based on "customary
norms of personal noncommercial use," and thereby provides swift
authorization for clear fair uses. 130 For uses not covered by the first
123 Burk & Cohen, supra note 47, at 63.
124 Id. at 59-6o.
125 Noguchi, supra note 24, at 9.
126 Armstrong, supra note 94, at 84. Since European copyright law's exemptions are more
discrete, automatic fair use algorithms are more effective, although they still cannot match
human decision-makers. Burk & Cohen, supra note 47, at 70.
127 Burk & Cohen, supra note 47, at 63-64.
128 Id. at 64.
129 Armstrong, supra note 94, at 82-83; Burk & Cohen, supra note 47, at 65-66. Burk and
Cohen have also recently classified five theoretical models for understanding consumer
interests, and have suggested how to proceed based on those frameworks. See Dan Burk &
Julie Cohen, Models of Consumer Protection in DRM, Copyright, Digital Rights
Management Technology and Consumer Protection Symposium, University of California-
Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/copyright/presentations/Cohen.pdf (March
9, 2007).
13o Burk & Cohen, supra note 47, at 65.
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layer, the second layer would allow users to seek access permission
from the escrow agent, and the escrow agent would send back digital
keys if the use is authorized.131 This hybrid system would offer robust
fair use protection due to the automatic layer, efficient protection via a
comprehensive two-tiered approval system, and correct application of
fair use law through nonbiased algorithms and third-parties. This
design also protects user privacy rights by eliminating the need for
content owners to directly monitor and approve fair uses and by
requiring escrow agents to implement strict privacy-protective
procedures. However, uses that straddle the boundary of what
constitutes a fair use are precisely those uses that invoke the most
substantial privacy concerns, given that they may be infringing. Since
escrow agents may collect ID data, they may not be able to provide
fully anonymous pre-DRM-type fair uses.132
Armstrong has set forth a modified version of this mixed fair use
infrastructure. In his model, if the automatic algorithm denies access,
a user has the option of petitioning the escrow agent for access, or
forcing access through a quid pro quo arrangement if the user deems
the escrow agent method to be burdensome.33 This quid pro quo
arrangement would mandate users to provide contextual information
for recording in an audit trail in exchange for access. 34 This audit
trail could be implemented via pseudonymous credentials in order to
preserve user privacy, and owners could only access and be allowed to
decrypt these credentials if they believe a user is committing
substantial infringement. 135 Armstrong suggests that this audit trail
ensures that a user's ability to force access does not entirely declaw
DRM systems.3 6
Mulligan and Burstein have proposed another model that could
preserve privacy for users conducting fair uses. 37 They suggested
131 Id. at 65-66. Burk and Cohen suggest the Library of Congress as an example of a public
organization that could inhabit this role, but are skeptical over whether a private
organization could do so. Id. at 66-67.
132 Armstrong, supra note 94, at 88.
133 Id. at 1OO-01.
134 Id. at 101.
135 Id. at 106-07.
136 Id. at 102.
137 Id. at 91 (citing Deirdre Mulligan & Aaron Burstein, Implementing Copyright
Limitations in Rights Expression Languages, Digital Rights Management: ACM CCS-9
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improving fair use protections by altering current Rights Expression
Languages ("RELs"),138 including XrML,139 to make the expression of
context-dependent policies, like fair use, easier.'4o They also
recommend adding a new messaging protocol to XrML that lets end
users assert rights over content in their possession.'41 Their system
would restore certain fair use rights by allowing numerous default
positions for different media types, rather than a one-size-fits-all
approach that is not sensitive enough to recognize context-dependent
policies.42 They would also implement protective measures to ensure
that their system would not become a tool for surveillance by
copyright owners. 43 For example, the DRM system would not record
a user's personally identifying information or usage statistics,
ensuring that copyright owners could not use that information to
bargain with users for rights that are freely available under the fair use
doctrine.' 44 Fox and LaMacchia have set forth a similar system of
negotiated safe-harbors expressed in RELs for clear fair uses.145
Another approach involves a programming language called
LicenseScript that is used specifically in DRM in order to overcome
problems with XML based languages. 146 It can be cumbersome to
program complex conditional rules in XML-based RELs and even
Workship, DRM 2002, LNCS 2696, at 137, 139 (Joan Feigenbaum ed., 2003), available at
http://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu/samuelsonclinic/files/copyright-rights-expression.pd
f).
138 A Rights Expression Language ("REL") defines user rights with respect to files and
processes on a machine. For example, such a language can control file access, printing, or
copying to a clipboard.
139 XrML (eXtensible Rights Markup Language) is an REL that is utilized for the MPEG-21
multimedia format.
140 Armstrong, supra note 94, at 91.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 93.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 94.
145 Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM
Systems, Commc'ns of the ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61.
146 See Cheun Ngen Chong et al., LicenseScript: A Novel Digital Rights Language and its
Semantics, http://purl.org/utwente/fid/1152 (2003); Armstrong, supra note 94, at 94-96.
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impossible to express many context-specific rules requiring data input
that lie at the heart of many copyright exemptions.147 LicenseScript
purports to solve these issues. This approach is far more deferential
to copyright holders and records all instances of fair use.148 Still, some
have noted that this basic technological model could be modified to
more properly protect fair use.149
Noguchi has offered several broad recommendations on DRM
configuration that will: (i) allow the creation and use of private
copies, (2) allow content to be given to family and friends, (3) allow
users to preview content, and (4) exclude the public domain from
DRM protection.150
Broadly speaking, the core aim of these copyright-based designs
are to define accesses and uses that are allowed versus those that are
forbidden, to ensure that these designs do not entail collection and
abuse of users' private information, and to provide quick and ideally
instantaneous access upon user request. This general framework is
applicable to any situation governing user access and data use in a
computer system, including the scenario of users accessing trusted
systems that protect personal information. Specifically, a mixed-use
architecture with a layered design and context-specific definitions in
RELs can be used for corporate information access rules in addition to
fair use rules.
C. COMBINING THESE APPROACHES AND LOOKING AHEAD
Many of these proposals are not mutually exclusive and can thus
be simultaneously implemented in one, multi-tiered approach. The
following discussion describes how the foregoing solutions can be
implemented together. Users could access trusted systems using
pseudonymous identifiers through a layered authentication process
which uses RELs to define context-specific access and use rules in the
first layer, and a user option of an escrow agent or forced access in the
second layer. The escrow agent should erase user-specific records of
access to maintain user trust in making second-layer requests and to
protect user privacy. At most, the escrow agent should collect only
147 Id. at 94-95.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 99.
150 Noguchi, supra note 24, at 8.
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anonymous use data if for example this data could help streamline the
escrow agency system. The forced access option should require
owners to access the audit trail to reveal potentially infringing uses
only under exceptional circumstances. Finally, the REL codes could
be programmed in a modular fashion so that these context-specific
rules could be altered quickly.
Public regulatory oversight is a promising option to ensure that
DRM architectures do not lag behind quickly evolving fair use laws or
information access standards. Further, a one-size fits all approach is
dangerous given the myriad uses of DRM and trusted systems for
protecting varying types of information. The FCC would be a logical
candidate for the regulatory oversight role and could provide a
repository of modular REL codes that are updated according to new
laws and standards for different DRM devices and applications.
Although this entails the intervention of a public regulatory body for
REL code updates as well as another regulatory body like the Library
of Congress to serve as an escrow agent, this approach still prevents
bureaucratic inefficiencies from chilling spontaneous uses, due to the
existence of the forced access option. Moreover, the existence of the
forced access option ensures that users do not inundate escrow agents
with requests, thus avoiding the creation of a bloated regulatory body
and large request backlogs.
This implementation is clearly deferent to users compared to
owners, given that users have near carte blanche access privileges that
cannot be monitored by owners unless the audit trails evince flagrant
misuses of user privilege. However, the protection conferred upon
owners still exceeds the pre-DRM world, and a precipitous change to a
universal owner-centric DRM lockdown would disrupt the social and
creative dynamic, as this paper has emphasized.
Still, owners can rest assured that as artificial intelligence evolves
to better define context-dependent policies, the need for the second
layer of the mixed-use architecture will be gradually swallowed by the
artificial intelligence of the first layer. A fully developed artificial
intelligence will eventually provide virtually all the necessary access
rights and privacy protections to users, while limiting the ability of
users to circumvent DRM restrictions on legitimately protected data.
VI. CONCLUSION
DRM is here to stay, so the lingering issue is its ultimate role.
Legal, policy, social and technological changes are all relevant to
DRM, yet these changes are rarely considered together. A
comprehensive approach involving changes in all of these areas is
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necessary to set forth a rational implementation of DRM that
accommodates proprietors' rights in content or data, and preserves
users' privacy, access, and fair use rights.
